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Are America's basic industries, pressured by overwhelming im-
port competition, becoming an anachronistic "Rust Belt"? Must 
government step in to assure the survival of older, heavy indus-
tries, especially in the Midwest? Are we becoming a service econ-
omy focusing on information, hamburgers, and dress shops? 
The facts available to answer these questions are undramatic, 
not supportive of any extreme position, and thus uncompetitive in 
the marketplace for public policy viewpoints. The truth of the mat-
ter is that some of this nation's heavy industry is no longer com-
petitive and is in the process of shrinking in size and importance; 
steel and automobile companies have reported the most dramatic 
cutbacks. Yet, on balance, the answer to each of the questions is a 
clear "no." If there is a "Rust Belt," it is far more a question of per-
ception than reality. 
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University 
Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of American Business 
at Washington University in St. Louis. Michael J. Athey is John M. Olin 
Fellow research assistant at the Center. This report was originally 
published as "What Is the Rust Belt's Problem?" Chapter 6 in The In-
dustrial Policy Debate, Chalmers Johnson, ed. (1984). Reprinted by per-
mission of ICS Press, Institute for Contemporary Studies, Suite 750, 
785 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94103. 
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Analytical Traps 
1981 1983 
By and large, American manufacturing companies-hard goods 
and soft goods producers alike-are holding their own while ad-
justing to the business cycle. As can be seen in figure 1, both dur-
able and nondurable manufacturing sectors in the United States 
have recovered from the 1981-82 recession. By December 1983, 
total industrial production had attained an all-time peak. 
In view of these facts, how do we account for the gloom-and-
doom talk about the sad prospects for U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries? First of all, the casual observer tends to generalize from a 
few highly publicized instances of true distress. Moreover, the 
positive side of economic events is rarely considered newsworthy 
and thus escapes widespread public attention. 
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But, perhaps most important, the authors of the new gospel of 
industrial policy-as well as other "megatrend" thinkers-have 
fallen into one of the oldest analytical traps. They have drawn 
heroic and long-term conclusions from the most recent data that 
they have seen. Many of the gloom-and-doom soothsayers were 
doing their writing in 1981 or 1982 when the economy was declin-
ing and, in a simpleminded fashion, they merely extrapolated that 
decline into the future. Such action is on a par with reacting to the 
spring rains by rebuilding Noah's ark. 
However, to react with euphoria to news of the upturn is, of 
course, as silly as treating the downside of a business cycle as a 
fundamental and lasting new development. It is intriguing to note 
that some observers at the conservative end of the political 
spectrum are beginning to do just that. To write about the runa-
way boom of the 1980s is also misleading because it sets up unat-
tainable expectations. 
It is useful to examine the trend of output in key sectors of the 
American economy. As shown in table 1, total durable goods pro-
duction dropped 11 percent from 1981 to 1982. Smaller declines 
occurred in the broader aggregates, such as all manufacturing and 
total industrial production. All three aggregate measures, how-
ever, remained substantially above the levels of the 1970s. The 
point is not to underestimate the severity of the recent recession. 
Rather, it is to perceive the underlying strength of the American 
economy. 
When we examine individual industry groups, we find a more 
diverse pattern. For example, primary metals (including steel) 
took a bad tumble, declining by 31 percent between 1981 and 
1982. In contrast, transportation equipment (which covers both 
automotive and aerospace production) was down by 9 percent and 
instrument producers (a heavily defense-oriented sector) reported 
a 5 percent drop. 
Of greater interest is the nature of the snapback in 1983. Two 
industry groups exceeded their 1981 highs: electrical machinery 
and transportation equipment. At the other end of the spectrum of 
performance, the 1983 recovery in primary metals (up 15 percent) 
did not bring that industry back to its 1975 level of output. 
Nevertheless, taking full account of the variations among indus-
tries, it seems clear that the decline in heavy manufacturing in-
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dustries that was so noticeable in 1982 did not represent a new 
and durable long-term trend. Rather, the decline was primarily 
the result of a severe but short-term cyclical contraction. 
This report focuses on output as the prime indicator of the eco-
nomic performance of business firms. Yet there is a great amount 
of interest in employment. It is the high levels of unemployment 
that exacerbate pressures for restricting imports and for provid-
ing federal bailouts of domestic corporations. However, public dis-
cussions rarely acknowledge the relationship between production, 
job creation, and productivity. That is, in an economy with rising 
productivity (technically, output per worker hour), we would ex-
pect that employment rises more slowly than does output. In fact, 
instances of slowly growing or stable output might be accom-
panied by declining employment. That is, declining employment 
does not automatically and inevitably imply declining production. 
And the health of an industry is determined not by its demand for 
inputs (labor, capital, etc.) but by its supply of output-by its con-
tribution of goods and services to the society's standard of living. 
It can be seen in table 2 that total manufacturing employment 
in the United States has fluctuated in the range of 18 to 20 million 
since 1970; 1982's performance, although low, was merely at the 
bottom end of the range. The decline that year was followed by an 
expansion in 1983 that extended to every major hard goods sector. 
These statistics clearly do not support a counsel of despair. 
Statistical Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing, 1970-82 
The burst of concern about the decline of U.S. manufacturing has 
focused on the older, low-tech industries often referred to collec-
tively as the "Rust Belt." Let us see what the facts are. We divide 
the industries into two groups: high-tech and low-tech. 1 We do this 
by ranking manufacturing industries by the ratio of their R&D 
expenditures to sales. The high-tech industries are those whose 
ratio exceeds the average for all manufacturing in 1980. The low-
tech sectors are those with R&D-to-sales ratios below this 
average.2 
We now turn to the question "Is there a Rust Belt that is in 
decline?" To answer this, we examine the most comprehensive 
body of data available, the statistics on income produced by two-
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digit manufacturing industry, as reported in the national income 
and product accounts for the period 1970-82.3 On the basis of 
econometric analysis, we group each industry into one of the 
following three categories: (1) those that showed a rising trend in 
output over the period, (2) those that showed a stable trend, and 
(3) those that showed a declining trend. Results for the period are 
presented in table 3.4 
As can be seen, there is no statistical support for the claim that 
the low-tech industries are declining or, as a group, even reaching 
a period of stagnation or stability. Why, then, do so many commen-
tators contend that low-tech industries are declining? We suggest 
three possibilities: (1) they draw long-term conclusions from the 
data for the last few years, (2) they equate trends in employment 
in an industry with its overall health, or (3) they implicitly define 
"declining" as growing more slowly than the rest of the economy. 
Trend in 
output 
Growth 
Stability 
Decline 
Table 3 
Trend in Real Income Produced 
by Industry, 1970-82 
High-tech 
industries 
Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
Instruments and related 
products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
None 
Low-tech 
industries 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Fabricated metal products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Leather and leather products 
Primary metal industries 
None 
Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S. 
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for 
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984). 
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The business cycle rediscovered. The period from 1970 to 
1982 was a time of major economic disruptions. With supply 
shocks from the rapid rise in food exports and an oil embargo 
followed by a dramatic rise in oil prices, the U.S. economy was sub-
jected to wide swings and deep recessions in 1973-75, 1980, and 
1981-82. 
The majority of two-digit manufacturing industries followed 
this same pattern. In the 1950s and 1960s, they showed a 
relatively stable upward trend, taking in stride the recessions that 
occurred during this time. This, however, was not the case in the 
1970s and early 1980s. In the face of severe recessions, the 
manufacturing industries experienced much deeper and longer 
declines than in the earlier period. This is the environment from 
which the proponents of an industrial policy have developed their 
arguments. 
Focusing our attention on the period 1981-82, we see all the in-
dustries suffering what appears to be a significant decline. But, on 
reflection, when the economy goes through a recession it is not 
surprising to see the manufacturing industries decline more than 
proportionately. The other side of the coin, however, is that in 
1983 these same industries recovered from the recession more 
rapidly than the rest of the economy. Thus, historical data do not 
support the conclusion that the low-tech industries are declining. 
Is employment the problem? To many people, an upward 
trend in employment is a sign of a healthy and growing industry. 
All but two of the high-tech industries experienced growth in 
employment over the period 1970 to 1982 (see table 4).5 Thus, 
there is some logic in taking the trend in job creation in those in-
dustries as a rough approximation of general growth. 
When the same analysis is made for the low-tech industries, we 
obtain more mixed results. Six of the fifteen low-tech industries 
show declining trends in employment, while only four industries 
demonstrate signs of growth. 
The question that must be addressed, however, is whether or 
not it is necessarily true that an industry that is reducing its labor 
force is truly a declining industry. This proposition-which un-
derlies so much of the popular writing on industrial policy-does 
not necessarily hold. Surely an industry whose output is declining 
8 
Trend in 
employment 
Growth 
Stability 
Decline 
Table4 
Trend in Employment by Industry, 1970-82 
High-tech 
industries 
Machinery, except electrical 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Instruments and related 
products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
None 
Low-tech 
industries 
Furniture and fixtures 
Printing and publishing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Fabricated metal products 
Food and kindred products 
Paper and allied products 
Lumber and wood products 
Primary metal industries 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Leather and leather products 
Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S. 
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for 
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984). 
is also likely to be reducing employment. Yet there are other 
reasons why employment may be decreasing. Referring back to 
table 3, we recall that most of the industries have been growing 
in terms of output, and the three exceptions are holding their 
own. This means that most of those industries that are declining 
in terms of employment are at the same time increasing their 
productivity. 
More aggregate analyses show that, in each of the past six 
recoveries, a higher level of manufacturing output has been at-
tained with fewer workers working fewer hours. This is primarily 
a result of the long-term trend in productivity growth, combined 
with the cyclical effects of overhead reduction and the closing of 
the least efficient production facilities. 6 
The relevant point is that employment problems may arise when 
a healthy industry is merely adjusting to changes in its environ-
9 
ment. That is, many of the industries classified here as low-tech are 
becoming more automated in order to compete and survive in the 
marketplace. In many specific instances, company investments in 
new productive equipment have increased the productivity of in-
dividual workers and thus reduced the demand for total employ-
ment. For example, in the textile industry, lasers inspect 10,000 
yards of cloth an hour-fifteen times faster than a human once 
could. In the steel industry, lasers and innovative sensing devices 
perform inspections and even check refractory lining wear in steel-
making furnaces. 7 Economizing on labor costs, of course, can be a 
key to maintaining an industry's competitiveness. 
The manufacturing sector relative to the economy. Some 
of those who worry that low-tech industries are declining do not 
focus on decreases in output in an absolute sense. They consider 
an industry's performance to be unsatisfactory if it is not growing 
at least as rapidly as the economy as a whole. Hence, if the low-
tech industries are declining according to this definition, we 
should observe over the period 1970 to 1982 a significant negative 
trend in the ratio of industry income to national income. 
To test this hypothesis, we use a statistical methodology similar 
to that developed for table 3.8 In table 5, we see that high-tech in-
dustries have been growing at least as fast as the economy, two at 
a faster rate. That should come as no surprise. What about the 
low-tech industries? According to the proposition being examined, 
we should expect that these industries would demonstrate slower 
growth than the national average, or even a decline. This is true of 
some but not all. Five of the fifteen industries are growing less 
rapidly than the economy as a whole. However, such industries as 
tobacco manufacturing and petroleum and coal products have 
been growing faster than the economy. Hence, any tendency for 
low-tech industries to grow more slowly than the economy is by no 
means universal. 
In short, the data on national income by industry, when viewed 
in real terms during the period from 1970 to 1982, do not support 
the claim that the old-time industries located in America's "Rust 
Belt" are going the way of the dinosaur.9 All of the industries, both 
high-tech and low-tech, show at least stability over this period, 
with no examples of industries with absolute long-term declines in 
levels of output. 
10 
Trend 
Growing 
faster than 
national 
income 
Growing at 
about the 
same rate 
Growing 
more slowly or 
declining 
Table 5 
Industry Growth Patterns Compared 
to the National Average, 
1970-82 
High-tech 
industries 
Machinery, except electrical 
Instruments and related 
products 
Electric and electronic 
equipment 
Other transportation 
equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment 
Chemicals and allied products 
None 
Low-tech 
industries 
Tobacco manufacturing 
Petroleum and coal products 
Lumber and wood 
products 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products 
Food and kindred products 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textile 
products 
Leather and leather products 
Source: Murray L. Weidenbaum and Michael J. Athey, "The 'Decline' of U.S. 
Manufacturing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications" (St. Louis: Center for 
the Study of American Business, Working Paper no. 87, 1984). 
Shortcomings of Existing Industrial Policy 
In the debate on industrial policy proposals, it is important to note 
that many existing government policies affect industry in impor-
tant ways and often have contributed to the difficulties faced by 
the manufacturing sector. These negative impacts of government 
action are, in the main, side effects of laws designed for other pur-
poses: providing a more equitable tax structure, redistributing in-
come and wealth, enhancing the quality of life, improving the 
physical environment, and so forth. 
Intentionally or not, many of these policies have weakened the 
manufacturing sector of the economy, either by increasing its 
costs or by reducing the amount of capital available for expansion 
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and for new product development. This influence on the funda-
mental structure of American industry can be seen as manufac-
turing companies shift portions of their work force away from the 
creative and productive areas of business such as R&D, manufac-
turing, and marketing. The result has been an increase in over-
head functions such as legal activities, accounting and finance, 
public affairs, and government relations.l° For the individual firm, 
changes in the corporate work force may be essential to respond to 
pressures from government agencies and self-styled public in-
terest groups. But the effect of these shifts on national produc-
tivity and competitiveness is negative. Poorer industrial perfor-
mance, in turn, leads to calls for an industrial policy. 
If we overlook these structural responses to existing govern-
mental policy, all that is visible are pleas for bailouts, subsidies, 
and other special assistance. But, on reflection, the willingness of 
government to bail out a Lockheed or a Chrysler is not surprising. 
It is the price that Congress pays to avoid dealing with the un-
derlying industrial problems that arise from the present pattern 
of governmental intervention in the economy. 
A focal point for the current advocates of industrial policy is the 
proposed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion (RFC), sometimes under a more euphonious name such as a 
"national development bank." Attention is usually focused on the 
contributions that the RFC made during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s and World War II. Yet, most of its loans to business were 
made in the postwar boom period of the late 1940s and early 
1950s. 
There is much to learn from the operations of the RFC. Its his-
tory shows that government subsidy of business encourages a 
misallocation of resources and provides opportunity for political 
favoritism. The RFC experience also demonstrates that govern-
ment programs develop a life of their own and persist long after 
the problems for which they were created have been solved.l 1 
Variations on the negative theme of propping up the economy's 
"losers" are not limited to the notion of bringing back the RFC. 
Some would attempt to stop economic change by dealing with the 
so-called "runaway plant problem"; their response is to make it ex-
tremely difficult and costly to move or close down an industrial 
facility. This "King Canute" approach ignores the reasons why 
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companies are forced to take such actions in the first place. Fre-
quently, in fact, those plants have lost their competitiveness due in 
large part to the government policies advocated by the same groups 
that now support legislation against runaway plants. Proposals also 
overlook the negative signals that would be sent to any company 
considering building a new plant in a region that had adopted 
restrictive legislation (and a few states already have done so). 
Close cousins of this negative approach are proposals to "pro-
tect" various industries and markets from foreign competition 
and to inhibit American investments overseas. None of these ap-
proaches would lead to a more productive or more competitive 
economy. They often would shelter companies and localities from 
their own mistakes. 
T he simple-minded dichotomy that sees only expanding high-tech and declining low-tech industries needs to be examined 
more carefully than has been done by the widely publicized prog-
nosticators of the demise of traditional industry. If industrial 
giants of the past such as Andrew Carnegie and Harvey Firestone 
were to visit their old companies, they would be pleasantly 
surprised by the array of high technology now in use: industrial 
robots, sophisticated process control, laser inspection, flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS), automated material handling, 
and CAD/CAM (computer-aided design along with computer-aided 
manufacturing) .12 
Deere & Company's sprawling tractor works provides a good ex-
ample. The facility includes four FMS installations and sixteen 
machining centers-groups of totally automated machines and 
conveyors linked to a computer. In addition, visitors can see 
robotic welding and robotic spray painting with computers provid-
ing total integration of conveyors, towlines, monorails, cranes, and 
automated storage and retrieval systems. There is hardly a con-
ventional forklift truck in sight. 
Many companies have adopted "flexible manufacturing," a 
high-tech marriage of robots and computers. Deere's plant can 
turn out tractors in more than 5,000 configurations. General 
Electric now makes 2,000 versions of its basic electric meter at a 
single small plant.l3 In a new facility, General Motors has in-
stalled a robot system that paints its cars. The man-machine in-
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terface is being redefined. Manual operations using gears, pulleys, 
and belts have often been replaced by microprocessors, keyboards, 
electronic switches, and cathode ray tubes. 
It is ironic that, just when the promoters of industrial policy in 
the United States are bemoaning the effects of reliance on free 
markets, writers in the USSR are blaming that nation's poor eco-
nomic performance on the centralized nature of the Soviet state. 
Here are some of the "outdated ... peculiarities of the system of 
state economic management" that Soviet economists bemoan: 
• "a very high degree of centralization in economic decision-
making'' 
• "the inhibition of market forces" 
• "a centralized system of allocation of materials and supplies to 
all enterprises" 
• "the centralized regulation of all forms of material incentives 
for workers" 
• "overlapping authority and resulting confusion among minis-
tries and agencies" 
• "the limited economic authority and, as a result, the limited 
economic liability of enterprises for the results of their eco-
nomic performance"I4 
It is intriguing to read the Soviets' own description of how in-
dividuals attempt to adjust to this "most rigid regimentation of 
economic behavior": 
The population always enjoys a certain amount of freedom to respond to 
the limitations imposed by the state .... When established rules and 
regulation ... affect the vital interests of certain categories of people, 
they look for ways to circumvent the constraints and satisfy their re-
quirements. Then the state introduces still harsher measures to block 
undesirable forms of activity, in response to which the population comes 
up with more refined methods that make it possible to meet their in-
terests under the new conditions. 15 
All this, however, need not lead to a do-nothing approach to the 
serious economic questions that face the United States. There is a 
growth strategy that involves no expansion in government power 
or federal spending. Its elements are basic: tax simplification, 
14 
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regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and curtailed govern-
ment lending. In each of these areas, much can be done. 
The 1981 tax reductions were surely helpful. But the sad fact of 
the matter is that the tax code is far more complicated today than 
it was just a few years ago. To anyone who has ever tried to fill out 
the tax forms for a small company, it is clear that simplification is 
not just a pleasant thought, but rather a vitally important need. 
Similarly, the regulatory relief effort has accomplished much in 
reducing the burden of new rules. But fundamental improvement 
can come only from revising existing statutes that mandate 
unreasonable burdens of compliance, such as the "zero discharge" 
goal of the Clean Water Act and the "zero risk" provision of the 
Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
Furthermore, it is ironic to contemplate the numerous in-
dustrial policy proposals for funneling federal funds to "worthy" 
private investment areas at a time when the federal government 
is running budget deficits in the neighborhood of $200 billion a 
year. The most effective way to increase private capital formation 
is just the reverse of the RFC approach-to reduce the federal 
drain on private saving represented by massive deficit financing. 
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing 
Peter to pay-or lend to-Paul. They do nothing to increase the 
pool of private saving. But they do reduce the amount available in 
the private market. 
The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is 
no secret: it is to reduce government barriers and achieve a better-
functioning market economy. However, this approach is not ac-
companied by any guarantee. In a truly dynamic, competitive 
economy, we do not know in advance where the new product 
breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will not be evenly dis-
tributed. But we do know that society as a whole will be better off, 
since it is likely that most-though not all-industrial workers 
and employers will enjoy higher real incomes and improved living 
standards. 
Surely positive public policy should enhance productivity, 
capital formation, and international competitiveness. The nega-
tive approaches embodied in most industrial policy suggestions, 
which extend further the role of government in the economy, are 
all adverse to these key economic goals. Given the gap between 
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the ideal embodied in most policy proposals and the shortcomings 
of actual practice, a cynic would perhaps conclude that the op-
timum amount of change in government actions directed toward 
the industrial economy is zero. 
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